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Workers' Compensation Is Not an Employee Benefit
Program: Howard Delivery Services, Inc. v. Zurich
American Insurance Co.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION - BANKRUPTCY CODE - PRIORITY
STATUS - The United States Supreme Court held that unpaid
workers' compensation premiums owed to a private creditor are
not afforded priority status in a bankruptcy proceeding as "contri-
butions to an employee benefit plan," largely because employers
receive at least an equal benefit from workers' compensation as do
employees.
Howard Delivery Servs., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 126 S. Ct.
2105 (2006).
Petitioner, Howard Delivery Service (hereinafter "Howard"),
owned and operated a freight trucking business, employing ap-
proximately 480 employees in twelve states.1 Each of those states
required Howard to provide workers' compensation coverage to its
employees. 2 Howard entered into an agreement with respondent,
Zurich American Insurance (hereinafter "Zurich"), wherein Zurich
was to provide workers' compensation insurance in ten of those
states. 3
On January 30, 2002, Howard filed a voluntary petition for re-
lief pursuant to Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code
in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District
of West Virginia. 4 Zurich reacted by filing an unsecured creditor's
claim, claiming priority status for approximately $400,000 in un-
paid workers' compensation premiums. 5 In an amended proof of
claim, Zurich asserted that § 507(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code
6
1. Howard Delivery Servs., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 126 S. Ct. 2105, 2109 (2006).
2. Howard Delivery, 126 S. Ct. at 2109.
3. Id.
4. Howard Delivery Servs., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. (In re Howard Delivery Servs.),
403 F.3d 228, 230 (4th Cir. 2005).
5. Howard Delivery, 126 S. Ct. at 2109. Zurich filed a second proof of claim, but did
not assert priority status for said second claim. Howard Delivery, 403 F.3d at 230 n.3.
6. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 507(a)(5) (Supp. 2006). In the time between the
Fourth Circuit's decision and the Supreme Court's decision, the numbering of the 507 pri-
orities in the Bankruptcy Code was altered by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Con-
sumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 212(2), 119 Stat. 51, changing the prior-
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afforded its claim priority status.7 Section 507(a)(5) accords prior-
ity status to unsecured creditors' claims for unpaid "contributions
to an employee benefit plan arising from services rendered.
'8
Howard objected to Zurich's basis for asserting priority status,
arguing that workers' compensation premiums are not afforded
507(a)(5) priority status as "contributions to an employee benefit
plan."9
The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of West Vir-
ginia agreed with Howard's argument. 10 The court noted that §
507(a)(5) was added to the Bankruptcy Code to overrule United
States v. Embassy Restaurant," which held that a debtor's unpaid
contributions to a bargained-for union welfare plan were not
within the priority afforded to unpaid "wages."'12 The court held
that, because the enactment of § 507(a)(5) overturned a decision
wherein the sole issue addressed was whether unpaid bargained-
for benefits were afforded priority status, Congress intended only
to afford priority status to the same.13 Therefore, the court denied
priority status to the unpaid workers' compensation premiums,
reasoning that only bargained-for benefits are within the purview
of the priority status afforded to "contributions to an employee
benefit plan." 14
Zurich appealed the decision to the United States District Court
for the Northern District of West Virginia, arguing that the bank-
ruptcy court's holding ignored the plain meaning of the statute
and that the bankruptcy court erred in ruling that priority under §
507(a)(5) is available only for bargained-for benefits. 15 The dis-
trict court disagreed and affirmed the bankruptcy court. 16 The
district court first noted that in contracting with a third-party
ity list so that (a)(3) became (a)(4), and (a)(4) became (a)(5). Howard Delivery, 126 S. Ct. at
2109 n.1. All references to the Bankruptcy Code in this case note, as in the Supreme Court
opinion, use the current numbering.
7. Howard Delivery, 126 S. Ct. at 2109.
8. 11 U.S.C.A. § 507(a)(5).
9. In re Howard Delivery Servs., Inc., No. 02-30289, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 2142, at *2-3
(Bankr. N.D. W. Va. Jul. 15, 2003).
10. Howard Delivery, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 2142, at *7.
11. 359 U.S. 29 (1959). The bankruptcy court failed to mention that 507(a)(5) was also
enacted in order to overrule Joint Industry Board of Electrical Industry v. United States,
391 U.S. 224 (1968), which followed Embassy Restaurant. Howard Delivery, 126 S. Ct. at
2110-11.
12. Howard Delivery, 126 S. Ct. at 2111.
13. Howard Delivery, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 2142, at *8-9.
14. Id.
15. Howard Delivery Servs., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. (In re Howard Delivery Servs.),
No. 3:03CV61, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26464, at *11 (N.D. W. Va. Dec. 22, 2003).
16. Howard Delivery, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *2.
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provider of workers' compensation insurance, the employer
shielded itself from the liability of providing workers' compensa-
tion benefits. 17 The design and purpose of workers' compensation
insurance, therefore, benefits the employer more than its employ-
ees. 18
The court also disagreed that § 507(a)(5) covered more than bar-
gained-for benefits. 19 The aim of § 507(a)(5), the court noted, was
to afford priority status to "fringe benefits" gained from "labor con-
tract negotiations, under which wage demands are often reduced if
adequate fringe benefits are substituted."20 Because workers'
compensation is statutorily mandated, employers may not offer
higher wages as a substitute for workers' compensation benefits.
21
The court concluded that workers' compensation benefits are not a
"fringe benefit" included within the term "employee benefit
plan."
22
The Fourth Circuit reversed two to one in a per curiam opin-
ion, 23 holding that workers' compensation premiums are afforded
priority status pursuant to § 507(a)(5), with the judges in the ma-
jority disagreeing on the rationale. 24 Judge King, concurring in
the judgment, found that workers' compensation premiums are
plainly and unambiguously "contributions to an employee benefit
plan. ' 25 Having found that workers' compensation premiums are
"contributions to an employee benefit plan," Judge King refused
Howard's invitation to examine the legislative history of the stat-
ute, noting that such an analysis would violate the long-standing
precedent of examining a statute's legislative history only after
the statute is found to be ambiguous.
26
Judge Shedd concurred in the judgment, but disagreed on
whether the phrase "employee benefit plan" is ambiguous.
27
Judge Shedd agreed with Judge King that the individual words
17. Id. at *12-13.
18. Id.
19. Id at *12.
20. Id at *13. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 187 (1978), as reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.A.A.N. 5963, 6313).
21. Howard Delivery, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26464, at *12.
22. Id.
23. A per curiam opinion is defined as "[an opinion handed down by an appellate court
without identifying the individual judge who wrote the opinion." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1125 (8th ed. 2004).
24. Howard Delivery Servs., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. (In re Howard Delivery Servs.),
403 F.3d 228, 229 (4th Cir. 2004).
25. Howard Delivery, 403 F.3d at 237 (King, J., concurring).
26. Id. at 238 n.14.
27. Id. at 238 (Shedd, J., concurring).
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within the phrase are unambiguous, but the phrase as a whole,
Judge Shedd noted, is ambiguous. 28 In support of his conclusion,
Judge Shedd noted that, while Judge King's definition was a rea-
sonable one, a definition of the phrase could just as reasonably
exclude workers' compensation premiums. 29 Finding the phrase
to be ambiguous, Judge Shedd examined the statute's legislative
history and concluded that it showed Congress' intent for workers'
compensation insurance plans to be within the definition of "em-
ployee benefit plan."30 Specifically, Judge Shedd believed that the
legislative history revealed Congress' intention for the term "em-
ployee benefit plan" in § 507(a)(5) to share the same meaning as
"employee benefit plan" under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA). 31 Because an "employee benefit plan" un-
der ERISA includes workers' compensation insurance plans,
Judge Shedd held the same should be true of the phrase "em-
ployee benefit plan" under § 507(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code. 32
Judge Niemeyer dissented.33 Like the bankruptcy court and the
district court, Judge Niemeyer felt that workers' compensation
premiums are not within the plain language of § 507(a)(5). 34 He
noted that a rule of statutory construction peculiar to the Bank-
ruptcy Code, which requires courts to narrowly construe statutory
priorities so that priority status is afforded only "when authorized
by Congress in clear and unequivocal terms,"35 prohibited afford-
ing workers' compensation premiums § 507(a)(5) priority status. 36
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
a split among the circuit courts.3 7 Writing for the majority, Jus-
tice Ginsburg reversed the Fourth Circuit, holding that workers'
compensation premiums owed by an employer to its workers' com-
28. Id. at 238-39.
29. Id. at 239.
30. Howard Delivery, 403 F.3d at 241 (Shedd, J., concurring).
31. Id. at 241 (citing Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 829
(1974) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000 & Supp. III)).
32. Id.
33. Id. (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 244.
35. Howard Delivery, 403 F.3d at 242 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
36. Id.
37. Howard Delivery Servs., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 126 S. Ct. 2105, 2110 (2006).
Before the Fourth Circuit's decision, four other circuits had considered the issue of whether
a debtor's unpaid premiums for workers' compensation insurance were afforded 507(a)(5)
priority status as "contributions to an employee benefit plan arising from services." How-
ard Delivery, 126 S. Ct. at 2110. The Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits all found that
workers' compensation premiums are not afforded 507(a)(5) priority status as they are not
"contributions to an employee benefit plan," while the Ninth Circuit found that workers'
compensation insurers are entitled to priority status. Id.
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pensation insurance carrier are not afforded § 507(a)(5) priority
status in a bankruptcy proceeding. 3
Justice Ginsburg began by focusing on the bankruptcy court's
central premise: that § 507(a)(5) was enacted to overrule United
States v. Embassy Restaurant39 and Joint Industry Board of Elec-
tric Industry v. United States,40 two cases which held that unpaid
contributions to a union welfare plan did not fall within the prior-
ity for unpaid wages. 41 While it is clear, Judge Ginsburg noted,
that the type of bargained-for benefits at issue in Embassy Res-
taurant and Joint Industry are within the § 507(a)(5) priority,
Congress' failure to define the terms "contributions to an employee
benefit plan arising from services rendered," made it equally un-
clear whether workers' compensation premiums are within the
same priority. 42
Before interpreting those undefined terms, Justice Ginsburg re-
jected Zurich's argument that Congress intended to incorporate
the ERISA definition of "employee benefit plan" into the Bank-
ruptcy Code.43 Quoting from United States v. Reorganized CF&I
Fabricators of Utah, Inc.,44 Justice Ginsburg noted that 'here and
there in the Bankruptcy Code Congress has included specific di-
rections that establish the significance for bankruptcy law of a
term used elsewhere in the federal statutes."'45 As no such direc-
tions are contained within § 507(a)(5), the Court rejected Zurich's
invitation to write them into the text.46
Justice Ginsburg next turned her attention to whether unpaid
workers' compensation premiums are accorded § 507(a)(5) priority
status. 47 While the Court concluded that they are not, it did not
reason that the statute, by its plain meaning, excluded workers'
compensation. 48 Rather, Justice Ginsburg held that unpaid work-
ers' compensation premiums are not afforded § 507(a)(5) priority
because of the essential character of workers' compensation in
38. Id. at 2109 (Roberts, C.J., and Stevens, Scalia, Thomas, and Breyer, JJ., joined in
the majority opinion).
39. 359 U.S. 29 (1959).
40. 391 U.S. 224 (1968).
41. Howard Delivery, 126 S. Ct. at 2111.
42. Id. at 2111-12.
43. Id. at 2113.
44. 518 U.S. 213 (1996).







contradistinction to the character of employer-sponsored pension
plans. 49
Particularly, Justice Ginsburg noted that, while employer-
sponsored pension plans benefit only the employee as wage substi-
tutes, workers' compensation insurance benefits both employees
and employers; namely, employees receive compensation for their
on-the-job injuries, while employers are shielded from tort liabil-
ity. 50 Since workers' compensation shields an employer from tort
liability, workers' compensation insurance, according to Justice
Ginsburg, is more similar to other forms of liability insurance
than it is to pension plans designed to ensure an employee's re-
tirement. 
51
The final difference Justice Ginsburg noted is that, even if an
employer fails to provide workers' compensation insurance, em-
ployees are able to receive the same benefit that said coverage
would have provided either through recourse to a state-
maintained emergency fund, or in an action in tort against the
employer.52 These alternate avenues are available because work-
ers' compensation, unlike other employee benefit plans, is statuto-
rily mandated in most jurisdictions. 53
Justice Ginsburg also mentioned that, in interpreting preferen-
tial portions of the Bankruptcy Code, courts are required to con-
strue priorities narrowly, so as not to give priority to a claimant
not clearly and unequivocally entitled thereto by the statute.
54
The Court, fearing that extending priority status in the absence of
a clear indication from Congress to do so would wrongfully dimin-
ish the funds available to unsecured creditors with either lower
priority or no priority, concluded it must deny priority status to a
debtor's unpaid contributions to a workers' compensation insur-
ance plan.
55
Lastly, Justice Ginsburg addressed another case where the
Fourth Circuit afforded priority status to a debtor's unpaid work-
ers' compensation premiums. 56 In New Neighborhoods, Inc. v.
West Virginia Workers' Compensation Fund,57 the Fourth Circuit
49. Id.
50. Howard Delivery, 126 S. Ct. at 2113-14.




55. Howard Delivery, 126 S. Ct. at 2114.
56. Id. at 2115.
57. 886 F.2d 714, 718-20 (4th Cir. 1989).
Vol. 45
Howard Delivery v. Zurich
addressed the issue of whether unpaid workers' compensation in-
surance premiums to a state fund, rather than a private insurer,
qualified for bankruptcy priority as an "excise tax" under §
507(a)(8)(E) of the Bankruptcy Code.58 The court held that such
an unpaid premium was indeed accorded priority status as an "ex-
cise tax."59 In explaining the distinction between the current hold-
ing and the Fourth Circuit's holding in New Neighborhoods, Jus-
tice Ginsburg noted Congress' general preference for government
creditors over private creditors. 60 Given that general preference,
Justice Ginsburg observed that it would be inconsistent to ad-
vance Zurich's claim to a fifth-level priority, while a government
creditor is only entitled to an eighth-level priority.61
Justice Kennedy dissented. 62 While Justice Kennedy did indi-
vidually address the arguments raised by the majority, his main
point of disagreement concerned the plain meaning of the stat-
ute.63 Justice Kennedy read § 507(a)(5) to mean that a program
which benefits employees in the ordinary sense of the term is con-
clusively an "employee benefit plan."64 Justice Kennedy further
argued that, while the majority properly cited the principle that
preferential provisions of the Bankruptcy Code are to be read nar-
rowly, it misapplied that principle, and read the provision "so nar-
rowly as to conflict with [the statute's] plain meaning."
65
The dissent alternatively argued that, even if employees must
receive a net benefit from the plan in question for it to be accorded
§ 507(a)(5) priority status as an employee benefit plan, workers'
compensation would still qualify.66 Despite the immunity from
tort liabilities that workers' compensation affords employers, prior
to the effectuation of workers' compensation, employers often won
58. Howard Delivery, 126 S. Ct. at 2115.
59. New Neighborhoods, 886 F.2d at 716.
60. Howard Delivery, 126 S. Ct. at 2115.
61. Id. Section 507 begins by stating that "[t]he following expenses and claims have
priority in the following order." Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 507(a) (Supp. 2006). Be-
cause the bankrtupt's creditors' claims are grouped according to their priority level, and
creditors accorded lower priorities are reimbursed only after the creditors accorded higher
priority levels have been totally compensated, a creditor's priority level may control
whether that creditor receives any compensation from the bankrupt's estate. Therefore,
the higher the priority level a creditor is accorded, the more likely that creditor will be paid
from the bankrupt's estate. In re Saco Local Dev. Corp., 711 F.2d 441, 446 (1st Cir. 1983).
62. Howard Delivery, 126 S. Ct. at 2117 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (Souter and Alito, JJ.,
joined in the dissenting opinion).






employee-filed tort suits for various reasons; namely, plaintiffs
had the burden of proving that employers were at fault, and em-
ployers were afforded the defenses of assumption of the risk, con-
tributory negligence, and the fellow-servant doctrine. 67 As a re-
sult, Justice Kennedy concluded that employees receive a net
benefit from workers' compensation because only a small percent-
age of injured employees ever recovered in tort prior to the effec-
tuation of workers' compensation.
68
Finally, the dissent addressed the arguments advanced by the
majority. 69 First, Justice Kennedy argued that workers' compen-
sation plans are wage substitutes. 70 Second, he reasoned that, by
relying upon the mandatory nature of workers' compensation in
the case at bar, the application of the Court's holding would de-
pend upon whether the jurisdiction of the debtor's place of busi-
ness statutorily requires workers' compensation. 71 Third, Justice
Kennedy contended that the fact that employees could obtain the
same benefit from a state-maintained fall back fund was irrele-
vant and ignored the purpose of granting priorities. 72 The priori-
ties afforded to employee wages and employee benefit programs
are meant to protect employees' financial well-being, and if the
insurers of employee benefit programs are not afforded priority
status, employees will be harmed either by the insurer's inability
to pay their benefits or by the insurer's need to charge higher
rates for identical coverage. 73 Lastly, Justice Kennedy noted that
when Congress uses a term of art in two separate statutes, the
term's meaning in the separate statutes should be shared, unless
the statutes have conflicting purposes. 74 Justice Kennedy opined
that since the Bankruptcy Code's priorities and ERISA do not
have conflicting purposes, the Court erred in finding that the term
of art did not have the same meaning in both statutes. 75
The purpose or aim of the Bankruptcy Code, to which Justice
Kennedy referred, is "to bring about an equitable distribution of
67. Howard Delivery, 126 S. Ct. at 2118 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 2119.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2119-20. Justice Kennedy noted that while only a few states have "wholly
permissive" workers' compensation regimes, "many offer exemptions for particular kinds of
employers." Id.





Howard Delivery v. Zurich
the bankrupt's estate among creditors holding just demands," 76
and "if one claimant is to be preferred over others, the purpose
should be clear from the statute."77  Since 1841, Congress has
clearly afforded priority status to employee wages in bankruptcy
proceedings. 78 However, alternative forms of compensation, i.e.,
fringe benefits, owed to a debtor's employees were not afforded
preferential treatment until 1978.79
Congress' decision to amend the Bankruptcy Code was
prompted by two decisions of the Supreme Court.80 First, in
United States v. Embassy Restaurant,8 1 the Court held that an
employer's unpaid contributions to a collectively bargained-for
union welfare plan were not afforded § 507(a)(4) priority status as
'wages ... due to workmen.' '8 2 In reaching its holding, the Court
stressed both the nature of the welfare fund8 3 and the above-
mentioned purpose of the Bankruptcy Code.
8 4
The Court began by describing the welfare fund and the rights
and obligations it created in both the employer and its unionized
employees.8 5 The collective bargaining agreement in Embassy
Restaurant required the employer to contribute "$8 per month per
full-time employee" into a trust.8 6 The proceeds of the trust were
paid as both life insurance and health benefits to its unionized
employees. 8 7 However, the trustees were given complete title to
the funds of the trust and full discretion to "establish the condi-
tions of eligibility for benefits."88 In other words, the union mem-
bers had no legal right or interest in the trust funds.8 9
76. Kothe v. R.C. Taylor Trust, 280 U.S. 224, 227 (1930).
77. Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 29 (1952).
78. United States v. Embassy Rest., 359 U.S. 29, 31-32 (1959). The Bankrupt Act of
August 19, 1841, established a third-level priority for creditor's owed wages from the
debtor. Embassy Rest., 359 U.S. at 32 n.4 (citing Bankrupt Act, 5 Stat. 445 (1841)).
79. Howard Delivery, 126 S. Ct. at 2111. Interestingly, Congress amended the Bank-
ruptcy Code in 1934 to afford workers' compensation premiums a seventh-level priority.
Embassy Rest., 359 U.S. at 32. However, Congress repealed said priority only four years
later. Id.
80. Howard Delivery, 126 S. Ct. at 2110.
81. 359 U.S. 29 (1959).
82. Embassy Rest., 359 U.S. at 33 (quoting Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2)
(Supp. V. 1952) (repealed 1978)).
83. Id. at 33.
84. Id. at 31.
85. Id. at 30-31.
86. Id. at 30.





After it examined the nature of the benefit plan, the Court re-
jected the trustees' argument that, since unions bargain for both
wages and benefits as part of a wage package, bargained-for bene-
fits should be included within the priority afforded to wages. 90
The Court cited the principle that restricts it from extending pri-
orities to creditors unless it is clear from that statute that Con-
gress intended such an extension. 91 The Court reasoned that
wages were accorded priority status because of the financial hard-
ship that an employer's bankruptcy inflicted upon its employees.
92
The Court further reasoned that, because the employees of the
debtor had no legal right to the trust funds, those funds offered no
support to the employees during their time of financial distress.
93
It was, therefore, far from clear that Congress intended contribu-
tions to benefit plans, to which employees had no legal right, to
share in the priority afforded to the wages due to employees.
94
Congress also abrogated Joint Industry Board of Electric Indus-
try v. United States95 with the 1978 enactment of § 507(a)(5). 96 In
Joint Industry, the Court held that "unpaid contributions to an
employees' annuity plan established by a collective bargaining
agreement" were not afforded priority status as wages. 97 In reach-
ing its holding, the Court reasoned that Embassy Restaurant was
controlling, 98 despite a significant distinguishing factor noted by
the dissent.99 While the debtor's employees in Embassy Restau-
rant had no legal right to the trust funds, such was not the case in
Joint Industry.100 In Joint Industry, the employee had a legal
right to sums paid into the fund. 101 This right was deferred until
the occurrence of a number of contingencies. 0 2 According to the
dissent, wages should not lose their priority status simply because
they are not immediately payable to an employee. 1
03
90. Id. at 31-32.
91. Id. at 33.
92. Embassy Rest., 359 U.S. at 33.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 391 U.S. 224 (1968).
96. Howard Delivery Servs., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 126 S. Ct. 2105, 2110-11
(2006).
97. Joint Indus., 391 U.S. at 225.
98. Id. at 226.
99. Id. at 231 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Joint Indus., 391 U.S. at 231 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
103. Id.
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Congress reacted to the Court's holdings in Embassy Restaurant
and Joint Industry by amending the Bankruptcy Code in 1978.104
The 1978 amendment to the Bankruptcy Code afforded priority
status to unpaid "contributions to an employee benefit plan aris-
ing from services rendered." 105 The First Circuit Court of Appeals
was the first federal appellate court to address the breadth of this
newly enacted provision in the case of In re Saco Local Develop-
ment Corp.10 6 The issue was whether a debtor's unpaid payments
toward a noncontributory "employee group life, health, and dis-
ability insurance" 10 7 plan were afforded priority status as contri-
butions to an employee benefit plan. 108 The court held that the
unpaid payments were entitled to priority status, reasoning that,
although the insurance plan was not the result of collective bar-
gaining, the plan was the result of a "de facto 'bargain' in which
employees accepted lower wages than other firms paid in return
for a noncontributory plan."'1 9 The Saco court further opined that
an insurer should have the right to obtain priority status for pre-
miums "attributable to insurance plan fringe benefits," because
allowing an insurer to obtain its premiums through the priority is
the best way to protect an employee's benefits due from the insur-
ance plan. 110
In Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Plaid Pantries,'11 the
Ninth Circuit held that a debtor's unpaid workers' compensation
premiums should be afforded priority status as contributions to an
employee benefit plan.112 The court noted that § 507(a)(5) was
added to overrule two cases that refused to afford priority status
to "fringe benefits." 113 The court reasoned that, although workers'
compensation is statutorily mandated, it is nevertheless a benefit
to employees, compensating them in times of distress. 114 The
court also reasoned that, since Congress did not amend §
507(a)(4), which gives priority to wages, when it enacted §
507(a)(5), it did not intend to grant priority only to wage substi-
104. Howard Delivery Servs., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 126 S. Ct. 2105, 2111 (2006).
105. 11 U.S.C.A. § 507(a)(5) (Supp. 2006).
106. 711 F.2d 441 (1st Cir. 1983).
107. Saco, 711 F.2d at 442.
108. Id. at 448.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 449.
111. 10 F.3d 605 (9th Cir. 1993).





tutes. 115 In adding a priority to the Code, Congress intended to
expand priority coverage to wage supplements, not just to wage
substitutes. 116
The next three circuits to address the issue of whether unpaid
workers' compensation premiums are afforded priority status in a
bankruptcy proceeding disagreed with the Ninth Circuit and held
that a debtor's unpaid workers' compensation premiums are not
afforded priority status as contributions to an employee benefit
plan. 117 The Eighth Circuit in In re HLM Corp.118 was the first of
the three circuits to disagree with the Ninth Circuit. 119 In support
of its holding, the court referenced the legislative history of the
Code section and opined that Congress intended to afford priority
status only to those benefits that were the result of em-
ployer/employee bargaining. 120 Since Minnesota, the jurisdiction
in which the debtor's business was located, statutorily required
employers to purchase workers' compensation insurance, the court
held that workers' compensation is not an employee benefit
plan. 121
The Eighth Circuit also recognized the benefit that employers
receive from workers' compensation, namely the shield from tort
liability.122 The court further noted that, if an employer, in viola-
tion of the law, fails to provide workers' compensation insurance
to its employees, they have the statutory right to receive the same
benefits from a state-maintained fund.123 Workers' compensation,
the court held, is a right and not a "true 'benefit"' - a term used
to describe a benefit available to an employee only through an em-
ployer-sponsored insurance program. 1
24
The next circuit to confront the issue of whether workers' com-
pensation is an employee benefit plan was the Tenth Circuit in In
re Southern Star Foods. 25 The Tenth Circuit, much like the
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See In re Birmingham-Nashville Express, Inc., 224 F.3d 511 (6th Cir. 2002); In re S.
Star Foods, 144 F.3d 712 (10th Cir. 1998).
118. 62 F.3d 224 (8th Cir. 1995).
119. HLM, 62 F.3d 224. Although the court did acknowledge the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion in Plaid Pantries, it rejected the holding of that case in only one sentence, saying "we
disagree [with the Ninth Circuit] and believe that they have excessively broadened the
reach of the Code language in question." Id. at 227.
120. Id. at 225-26.
121. Id. at 226.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. HLM, 62 F.3d at 226.
125. 144 F.3d 712 (10th Cir. 1998).
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Eighth Circuit, focused on the fact that workers' compensation is
not a bargained-for benefit, but one that is statutorily man-
dated.126 Additionally, the Tenth Circuit highlighted the immu-
nity from tort liability that employers receive from workers' com-
pensation, reasoning that because of that immunity, workers'
compensation actually benefits employers more than it does em-
ployees. 127 Lastly, the Tenth Circuit addressed the Ninth Circuit's
holding in Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Plaid Pantries.128
The court criticized that decision, reasoning that the Ninth Cir-
cuit, in derogation of the principle that Bankruptcy Code priorities
should be read narrowly, read the priority broadly. 1
29
Prior to Howard Delivery,130 the Sixth Circuit was the last cir-
cuit to hear this issue in the case of In re Birmingham-Nashville
Express, Inc. 131 While the Sixth Circuit began by citing the theme
of equal distribution to creditors and the corollary principle that
priorities should therefore be construed narrowly, its interpreta-
tion of the § 507(a)(5) priority began at a different point than other
circuits that had previously addressed these issues.132 The court
began its analysis by rejecting the First Circuit's holding in the
case of In re Saco Local Development Corp.,133 arguing that an
employer's unilateral payment for an employee insurance plan is
not a "contribution" within the meaning of the priority. 134 The
court opined that the priority for "contributions to an employee
benefit plan" is accorded only to those plans where employees con-
tribute a portion of their salary to fund the benefit plan. 135 The
court further interpreted the word "contribute" to include pay-
ments that are statutorily mandated, like workers' compensation
premiums in Tennessee, despite the term's common association
with voluntary or charitable transfers. 
3 6
Next, the Sixth Circuit addressed the meaning of the phrase
"employee benefit plan."'137 While the court noted that workers'
compensation insurance is explicitly included in the statutory
126. Star Foods, 144 F.3d at 716.
127. Id.
128. Id. (citing Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Plaid Pantries, 10 F.3d 605 (9th Cir. 1993)).
129. Id.
130. Howard Delivery Servs., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 126 S. Ct. 2105 (2006).
131. 224 F.3d 511 (6th Cir. 2000).
132. Birmingham-Nashville, 224 F.3d at 515.
133. 711 F.2d 441 (1st Cir. 1983).
134. Birmingham-Nashville, 224 F.3d at 515.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 516-17.
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definition of employee benefit plan under ERISA, the court main-
tained that ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code "serve different and
non-overlapping purposes," and therefore rejected any invitation
to incorporate the ERISA definition into the Bankruptcy Code.
138
Rather, the court reasoned that until Congress passed a clearer
statement, it must abide by the principle that priorities should be
interpreted narrowly and extended only when a claimant is clearly
and unequivocally entitled thereto.139 Finding workers' compen-
sation to be "an award arising out of a work-related injury," and
not a wage substitute, the court held that workers' compensation
is not an employee benefit plan. 140
Although it had already reached its holding, the Sixth Circuit
continued its opinion, analyzing a situation in which it had previ-
ously afforded priority status to workers' compensation premi-
ums.141 In the case of In re Suburban Motor Freight, Inc.,142 the
debtor owed workers' compensation premiums to a government
creditor.143 The Sixth Circuit held that those premiums were af-
forded what is now 507(a)(8)(E) priority status as claims by a
'governmental unit' for 'an excise tax on . . . a [pre-petition]
transaction."' 144 Thus, the private creditor in the later Sixth Cir-
cuit case argued that, because the Sixth Circuit had previously
afforded priority status to unpaid workers' compensation premi-
ums owed to a governmental unit, that decision, by analogy, re-
quired a similar result when the premiums were owed to a private
creditor.145 The court disagreed with the private creditor and ex-
plained that Congress often prefers public creditors over private
creditors. 146 The court, quoting its opinion in Suburban Motor,
stated that "'the workings of Government cannot await bank-
ruptcy distribution alongside unsecured creditors, with the possi-
bility, even the probability of receiving pennies on the dollar of
what the taxpayer-debtor owed."
' 147
Interestingly, the Fourth Circuit confronted the issue of
whether unpaid workers' compensation premiums owed to a public
138. Id. at 517.
139. Birmingham-Nashville, 224 F.3d at 517.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 517-18.
142. 998 F.2d 338 (6th Cir. 1993).
143. Birmingham-Nashville, 224 F.3d at 517.
144. Id. (quoting the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 507(a)(8)(E) (Supp. 2006)).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 518.
147. Id. (quoting Suburban Motor, 998 F.2d at 342).
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creditor were afforded priority status prior to deciding whether
the same debts owed to a private creditor were afforded priority
status. 148 In New Neighborhoods, Inc. v. West Virginia Workers'
Compensation Fund,149 the Fourth Circuit held that unpaid work-
ers' compensation premiums are afforded 507(a)(8)(E) priority
status as "excise taxes."150 The court, in dicta, addressed private
creditors and considered whether unpaid workers' compensation
premiums owed to a private creditor would be afforded priority
status.151 The court opined that they would not, explaining that
"such a difference is really only a 'distinction between the sover-
eign power of the state and the rights of private citizenry."'
152
The Fourth and Sixth Circuit cases granting excise tax priority
status to unpaid workers' compensation premiums owed to a pub-
lic creditor are truly interesting because the term "excise tax" is
also undefined by the Bankruptcy Code. 153 Therefore, when de-
termining whether unpaid workers' compensation premiums owed
to either public or private creditors are afforded priority status,
courts must first determine the meaning of two separate, unde-
fined priority provisions.154 Understanding that the underlying
objective of the Bankruptcy Code is equal distribution, and prefer-
ential provisions are therefore to be tightly construed, one could
reasonably anticipate that "excise taxes" would be construed nar-
rowly enough to exclude workers' compensation from its purview.
However, as recited above, both the Fourth 55 and Sixth Cir-
cuits156 have held that workers' compensation premium payments
owed to public creditors are within the meaning of "excise taxes."
Justice Ginsburg explained that this apparent inequality in
treatment is consistent with Congress' general preference for pub-
lic creditors over private creditors. 57 However, that preference
148. New Neighborhoods, Inc. v. W. Va. Workers' Comp. Fund, 886 F.2d 714 (4th Cir.
1989).
149. New Neighborhoods, 886 F.2d 714.
150. Id. at 719 (quoting the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 507(a)(8)(E) (Supp. 2006)).
Of particular interest was the court's reasoning that workers' compensation premiums
owed to a government creditor are afforded priority as "excise taxes" because of the em-
ployer's statutorily mandated obligation to provide workers' compensation. Id.
151. Id. at 719-20.
152. Id. at 720 (quoting State Indus. Accident Comm'n v. Aebi, 162 P.2d 513, 517 (Or.
1945)).
153. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 507(a)(8)(E).
154. See In re Suburban Motor Freight, Inc., 998 F.2d 338, 339-40 (6th Cir. 1993); New
Neighborhoods, 886 F.2d at 717.
155. New Neighborhoods, 886 F.2d at 719-20.
156. Suburban Motor, 998 F.2d at 342.
157. Howard Delivery Servs., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 126 S. Ct. 2105, 2115 (2006).
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should apply only when public and private creditors are similarly
situated. Here public and private creditors are not similarly situ-
ated, despite the fact that they both provide the same service.
Private creditors are, at least arguably, owed "contributions to an
employee benefit plan," while public creditors are owed unpaid
"excise taxes." Whether private creditors are afforded priority
status is, therefore, collateral to the fact that public creditors are
afforded priority status under a different priority.
The Court's decision in Howard Delivery, therefore, must find
its support, if it can find any support at all, in its interpretation of
the phrase "employee benefit plan." However, it is hard to under-
stand Justice Ginsburg's holding as anything other than reading
language into the statute rather than simply interpreting a statu-
tory provision. In holding that an "employee benefit plan" may
not simultaneously benefit the employer, Justice Ginsburg main-
tained that the term implicitly excluded programs that benefit
both employees and employers alike. 158 Furthermore, given that §
507(a)(5) was enacted to secure an employee's wage alternatives,
the benefit that an employer may also receive from a specific pen-
sion program is wholly irrelevant. Section 507(a)(5) priority is
meant to secure an employee's financial stability when that em-
ployee depends upon wage alternatives in addition to wages,
which are afforded § 507(a)(4) priority. 159
To hold that a pension program that benefits both employers
and employees does not qualify as an "employee benefit plan" sim-
ply because of the reciprocal benefits it affords ignores the purpose
of § 507(a)(5). Rather than read the provision narrowly, as the
Fourth and Sixth Circuits did when addressing whether unpaid
workers' compensation premiums owed to a public creditor were
afforded priority status as "excise taxes," the Court read language
into the provision, resulting in an interpretation that violates both
the intention and spirit of the provision.
Matthew J. Bates
158. Howard Delivery, 126 S. Ct. at 2113-14.
159. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 507(a)(4) (Supp. 2006).
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